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Visual Perception as Patterning: Cavendish against Hobbes on Sensation
Marcus P. Adams
Abstract
Many of Margaret Cavendish’s criticisms of Thomas Hobbes in the Philosophical Letters (1664)
relate to the disorder and damage that she holds would result if Hobbesian pressure were the
cause of visual perception. In this paper, I argue that her “two men” thought experiment in Letter
IV is aimed at a different goal: to show the explanatory potency of her account. First, I connect
Cavendish’s view of visual perception as “patterning” to the “two men” thought experiment in
Letter IV. Second, I provide a potential reply on Hobbes’s behalf that appeals to physiological
differences between perceivers’ sense organs, drawing upon Hobbes’s optics in De homine.
Third, I argue that such a reply would misunderstand Cavendish’s objective of showing the
limited explanatory resources available in understanding visual perception as pressing when
compared to her view of visual perception as patterning.
1. Introduction
In Margaret Cavendish’s view, her Philosophical Letters are the “building” (1664, preface;
hereafter Letters) that rests upon the foundation already laid in her Philosophical and Physical
Opinions (first edition 1655; second edition 1663; hereafter Opinions). In the Letters she
criticizes Descartes, Hobbes, More, van Helmont, and others by arguing for the superiority of her
philosophical system in its ability to explain various phenomena and to avoid the objections she
highlights.
Many of Cavendish’s criticisms of Hobbes in the Letters relate to the disorder and
damage that she holds would result if pressure, as Hobbes claims, were the cause of visual
perception and of cognitive activities such as the forming of conceptions. Pressure cannot be
responsible for visual perception since it would more likely “annoy and obscure” than “inform”
(1664, 20). If pressure were the cause of visual perception, the sentient organs would be “pressed
to death” and parts of the body like the eye would be “pressed into the centre of the brain,” and
the result would be a constant “war between the animal senses and the objects” (1664, 60). These
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criticisms relate to Cavendish’s general desire to account for the order and regularity of natural
phenomena in terms of bodies’ self-motion and perception by sensitive and rational matter.1
Beyond the disorder and damage that would result were Hobbes’s view correct,
Cavendish’s assault in the Letters incorporates an additional worry for the perception-as-pressure
model: Hobbes lacks the explanatory resources needed to accommodate everyday instances of
differences in visual perception, such as between two individuals perceiving one another at a
distance such that they perceive one another at differing degrees of clarity. To make this claim,
in Letter IV Cavendish provides a thought experiment about two such individuals and argues that
“if perception were made by pressure [as Hobbes holds], there would not be any such mistakes”
in visual perception (1664, 20).
Scholarly discussions of Cavendish’s natural philosophy have focused on her desire to
account for order and regularity. In this paper, I argue that her “two men” thought experiment in
Letter IV is aimed at a different goal: to show the explanatory potency of her account and the
corresponding lack of explanatory resources in Hobbesian natural philosophy. Cavendish holds
that Hobbes is simply unable to explain the regular occurrence of differing levels of “perfection”
in visual perception. Since Hobbes would seem to see the strengths of his natural philosophy as
the twin aspects of 1) simple assumptions (we need only assume bodies in motion pressing upon
each other) and 2) explanatory breadth (given these simple assumptions we can explain all

1

For discussion, see Duncan (2012, 397-399). Cavendish rejects both atomism and mechanism
due to considerations of the orderliness of nature (Detlefsen 2006, 207ff; James 1999, 222).
Detlefsen (2007) also connects Cavendish’s claims about order with the freedom of nature. Much
of the scholarly focus on Cavendish’s view has been on the role of order and regularity as
explanandum, but in the “two men” thought experiment that I discuss from the Letters (1664, 1820), as well as in Cavendish’s account of regularity in the Opinions (1663) that I discussion in
section 4.2, order and regularity play the role of explanans when Cavendish appeals to the
regularity of the motions in each of the senses. On the role of order as an assumption for
Cavendish, see Boyle (2015, esp. 439).
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perceptual and cognitive phenomena), Cavendish’s criticism in Letter IV is damaging. In a word,
she argues that, in his inability to account for an everyday commonplace like small differences in
perception, Hobbes’s assumptions are too simplistic.
My argument proceeds in three stages. First, I discuss Cavendish’s view of visual
perception as “patterning,” and I show the consequences that this view has for the “two men”
thought experiment in Letter IV. Second, I show that on a first reading of the thought experiment
it seems that Hobbes could easily account for differences in visual perception between two
individuals by appealing to physiological differences between the sense organs of each perceiver;
indeed, by discussing Hobbes’s explanation of degraded perception in old age in De homine, I
show that within his optics Hobbes appears to have these resources available to him. Cavendish
may have viewed such a reply made on Hobbes’s behalf favorably in the 1650s, especially since
she includes a chapter explaining “blindness” similarly in the first edition of Opinions (1655).
However, this chapter on blindness is removed by the time of the 1663 edition of Opinions.
By the 1660s Cavendish explains visual perception, and errors of it, by appealing to “patterning”
self-motions as well as by appealing to ways in which the rational matter and sensitive matter
can influence one another. Sometimes this influence causes mistakes in visual perception, for
example, making us think that we see “Hobgoblins” or smell unusual scents (1663, 277). I focus
on the 1663 edition of Opinions because of its closeness in Cavendish’s career to the Letters
(1664).2 Third, I argue that offering such a reply on Hobbes’s behalf, where differences in sense

Additionally, Cavendish describes the 1663 edition as having “corrected” the 1655 edition.
Walters (2013) has cogently argued that the 1663 edition of Opinions should be considered the
more authoritative edition. My goal in the present paper is to understand the two men thought
experiment with primary attention to the 1663 edition of Opinions. In addition to the aspect of
closeness in time to the Letters, Cavendish herself identifies Opinions as the “ground” of her
criticisms in Letter IV (1664, 18). In the final section, I draw upon Part VI of her later Ground of
Natural Philosophy (1668), which she then also calls the “second edition” of Opinions. There in
2
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organs would explain minor differences in the clarity of visual perception between two
perceivers, would misunderstand Cavendish’s objective of showing the limited explanatory
resources available in understanding visual perception as pressing – Cavendish’s claim is that
pressure is too simplistic an explanans to account for the everyday occurrence of minor
differences in visual perception.3

2. Cavendish on sensitive and visual perception
Cavendish is a materialist like Hobbes. However, Cavendish rejects Hobbes’s view that motion
“cannot be generated except by [a body] moved and contiguous” (OL I.110).4 Instead, for
Cavendish all motion is self-motion, often resulting from bodies perceiving and accommodating
other bodies by means of such self-motion but other times occurring without any external body
occasioning it, as in the case of the self-motions responsible for dreams (more on dreams below).
Thus, there is no transfer of motion in situations where body-body contact appears to occur.
Given her reliance upon self-motion as responsible for sensitive perception in general,
and visual perception in particular, Cavendish agrees with some of the Hobbesian account of
visual perception while rejecting other parts of it. In De corpore XXV, Hobbes defines sense as

Chapter XIII she explains the defects of sense organs in terms of a lack of knowledge proper to
the kind of body parts they are (1668, 85-86).
3
In what follows, I use ‘visual perception’ to refer to perception by humans and ‘sensitive
perception’ to refer to the more general sort of perception that Cavendish holds occurs
throughout all sensitive matter.
4
This principle related to the generation of motion is essential to Hobbes’s explanation of
sensation. Hobbes explicitly cites it in De corpore XXV (OL I.318). The Molesworth edition of
Hobbes’s Latin Works and the 1655 edition (1655, 224) incorrectly record this citation as to De
corpore VIII.9. Schumann (Hobbes 1999, 268) corrects the citation to De corpore IX.9. I cite
Hobbes (2005) as EW and Hobbes (1839–45) as OL, followed by volume and page. Adams
(2016) discusses Hobbes’s explanation of sensation in De corpore XXV and its connection to
first philosophy and geometry.
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“[...] a phantasm made by means of a reaction from an endeavour to [the] outside, which is
generated by an internal endeavour from the object, and there remains for some time” (OL
I.319).5 Thus according to Hobbes there are both external motions and internal motions involved
in explaining visual perception. An instance of Hobbesian visual perception begins in motions
from an object, which continue through various media, and ends in the resistance against those
motions by the internal endeavour from the parts of the sentient body. Cavendish agrees with
Hobbes that motion is responsible for visual perception, but since she holds that all motion is
self-motion she denies that motion from external objects is transmitted to parts of the sentient
body.
When these internal self-motions are occasioned by the presence of an external body then
visual perception occurs. However, sometimes these internal self-motions can occur even in the
absence of any external occasion, leading to dreams or illusions. She notes later in the Ground of
Natural Philosophy (hereafter Ground) that internal self-motions constitutive of visual
perception move “according to the outward Object” but when we are asleep these self-motions
“move by rote” (1668, 90). Since she identifies the “sense of seeing” with these internal selfmotions, she argues that even without sense organs like the eye being present the “sense of
seeing is not lost”:
…It is true, by Experience we find, that without an Eye we cannot see Outward
objects as they are without us, yet we see those Objects as they are without us in
our Sleep, when our Eyes be shut: Thus the Sense of Seeing is not lost, although
the Eyes were out, and the Optick Nerves stop’d up (1663, 294-295).

5

The definition leaves open the worry that pressing inanimate bodies will be endowed with
sense. Hobbes blocks this worry by claiming that for sense to occur there must be memory
whereby we are able to make a judgment (OL I.320-321, EW I.393; for discussion, see Duncan
2012).
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Considering what happens during sleep, or after the removal of the eyes, is designed to force one
to identify the cause of visual perception (this also applies for the other senses as well) as strictly
internal. Since indistinguishable self-motions can be present when occasioned by an external
body (an instance of visual perception) or without any such occasion (an instance of dreaming),
they must be self-motions. On this point, Cavendish argues that “the Interior motions may move
the Brain with the Variety of every Sense, without the Exterior Passages or Objects…” (1663,
297). As a result, we cannot hold that it is “Outward objects that make the sense, but the Animate
matter, which is Self-motion, which the Sense and Knowledge, and the Different motions
therein, and therefrom, make the Differences thereof…” (1663, 298).
Cavendish is led to this claim that in dreaming something indistinguishable to visual
perception occurs, even in the absence of the eye, because she holds that all motion is selfmotion.6 However, more generally Cavendish can hold such a view because, although she rejects
Hobbes’s account of perception, she embraces his understanding of cause as “entire cause”
(causa integra) (cf. Eileen O’Neill’s discussion in Cavendish 1666/2001, xxxiii; Michaelian
2009, 40). Hobbes defines an entire cause in De corpore IX.3: “But a cause simply, or an entire
cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how many soever they be, and of
the patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood
but that the effect is produced at the same instant…” (EW I.121-122).7 With this understanding
of causa integra, for Cavendish the internal self-motions of patterning and figuring are both
necessary and sufficient causes for human visual perception or for self-motions that are

6

On this issue of dreams being indistinguishable to us from visual perception, in Opinions
Cavendish argues that when the motions responsible for dreaming are “as strong and
industrious” as when we are awake we may sometimes “see, here [sic], taste, smell, touch, as
strong as if we were awake” (1655, 113).
7
Leijenhorst (1996) connects Hobbes’s use of causa integra to Suarez.
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indistinguishable from human visual perception, like dreaming.8 Another way of putting this
point is that since causes are always necessary for their effects on the causa integra view,
external bodies cannot be the cause of patterning since patterning can occur without any such
external objects being present (cf. Michaelian 2009, 40, fn. 23 for discussion).
In place of the Hobbesian principle that motion “cannot be generated except by [a body]
moved and contiguous” (OL I.110), Cavendish holds a form of vitalism according to which
matter exists in three “degrees”: inanimate, sensitive, and rational. She describes these degrees of
matter in Opinions (1663): “As for the Infinite Degrees of Matter, there be but two which are
Principle, as, Animate and Unanimate, and the Degrees of Animate are but Sensitive and
Rational, and the Degrees of Unanimate Matter is but Dense, Rare, Light and Heavy” (1663, 8).
These degrees of matter do not exist in isolation from one another as parts of the “Only Matter”;
rather, they are mixed together throughout nature so that “no particle in nature can be conceived
or imagined, which is not composed of animate matter, as well as of inanimate…” (1666, 158).
In adopting a form of vitalism whereby “the Only and Infinite Matter is Living and
Knowing” (1663, 13), Cavendish need not provide a mechanism on account of which
phenomena such as visual perceiving are made mechanically intelligible.9 On Cavendish’s view,
visual perception occurs by means of a capacity where the sensitive matter patterns after the

8

I limit this claim to humans since Cavendish demurs on whether patterning and figuring
motions are responsible for sensitive perception more generally: “Neither can I certainly affirm,
that all perception consists in patterning out exterior objects; for although the perception of our
human senses is made that way, yet nature’s actions being so various, I dare not conclude from
thence, that all the perceptions of the infinitely various parts and figures of nature are all made
after the same manner” (Cavendish 1666, 140).
9
Unlike Hobbes, whose aim was to make perceiving and cognition mechanically intelligible
(Adams 2014).
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motions of air, and the air itself self-moves as it copies after the self-motions of the objects being
perceived:
…the Motions of Outward objects Move and Figure the Air, being a Rare and
Soft Agil Substance, to its own Likeness, and so long as those Figures or Motions
last, those Figures and Motions are Sensible to the Senses, for the Senses Move
according to the Motions of the Objects in the Air, and for the most part, the
Reason Moves according to the Senses” (1663, 301-302; emphasis added).
When she asserts that the “Motions of Outward objects Move and Figure the Air,” we must
understand the motion of the air as one of self-motion and imitation. Elsewhere in Opinions,
Cavendish compares the motions of “soft or porous” air in response to “solid bodies” moving to
what happens when creatures “…print themselves in Snow…” (1663, 218-219). She holds that
“…as we move from Place to Place, new Figures are made [in the porous bodies such as air]”
(1663, 219). Since air is more porous and soft, it is more imitative and thus takes on the “print”
of more solid bodies. I suggest that Cavendish understands these motions, which air acquires, as
self-motions which appear and disappear easily. For example, she notes that “…when the Air is
Thin and Serene, the Print Dissolves as soon as the Figure Removes” (Ibid.). Even though air is
involved in this account of visual perception in Opinions (1663), it must be emphasized that air’s
self-motion would serve only as a medium for our visual perception of objects, and air is not
mentioned elsewhere in Cavendish’s explanations of visual perception.10

10

For example, air plays no role in the example from the Letters (1664, 20) to be discussed
below. Also, in Observations (1666) air plays no role in chapters XXXV and XXXVI; instead,
Cavendish refers to perception “of exterior objects” (e.g., 1666, 150; cf. 1668, 55). Although air
plays a role only in the discussion of visual perception in Opinions (1663), it is possible to
accommodate the involvement of air into the accounts that we find in Observations and Ground.
Here two points are relevant. First, as discussed already, Cavendish holds that “no particle in
nature can be conceived or imagined, which is not composed of animate matter, as well as of
inanimate…” (1666, 158). As a result, even though it is “soft” or “porous,” air will be composed
of both animate and inanimate matter, and the animate parts are capable of self-motion. Second,
the analogy between speech and perception that Cavendish makes in Opinions (1663, 299),
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For Hobbes, Cavendish’s account of visual perception as the sensitive matter patterning
after the self-motion of the air leaves a gap unexplained, a gap that Hobbes would claim makes
the view inconceivable. Since the subject of philosophy for Hobbes is “every body of which we
can conceive any generation” (EW I.10), patterning understood as self-motion would be
inconceivable because we are unable to imagine one body patterning after the motion of another
body without some body-body contact. In other words, Hobbes holds that attempting to
understand patterning, or any type of motion for that matter, as self-motion requires one to try to
imagine an ungenerated generation – something that is inconceivable.11 Unlike Hobbes’s appeal
to pressure, which for Hobbes fills the gap in Cavendish’s account, Cavendish posits that
sensitive matter has the ability to pattern motions outside of it.12 Once the sensitive matter in a
perceiver has patterned the motions of the air around an object, the rational matter (called
“Reason” in the quote above) patterns the motions of the sensitive matter.

discussed below in Section 4, might help illuminate how we could understand the role of air in
visual perception. Perception between an object and a perceiver requires the motions of the thing
being perceived to be communicated, but without any sort of body-body transmission. Air’s
ability to self-move in imitation of an object’s motions – what she calls being a “print” in
Opinions (1663, 218-219) – could enable this communication. Thus, just like when someone
speaks to a group of people there “are made Multitudes of Copies” of her words (1663, 300), we
might also expect Cavendish to hold that many copies of an object could be made in the air, like
a print in snow, and these copies would then enable our visual perception of it.
11
Conceivability as a constraint for philosophizing is operative when Hobbes introduces what
Jesseph (2006) calls the “persistence principle” in De corpore VIII.19: “Whatsoever is at rest,
will always be at rest, unless there be some other body besides it which, by endeavouring to get
in its place by motion, suffers it no longer to remain at rest” (EW I.115). Any attempt to
conceive self-motion, that is, to imagine a body self-moving, for Hobbes would be an exercise in
self-deceit (Jesseph 2006, 134). Adams (2014) discusses conceivability more generally in
Hobbes’s project.
12
In works following Opinions (1663) and Letters (1664), Cavendish adds self-knowledge to her
account of perception (more on self-knowledge below). She claims, for example, that “selfknowledge is the fundamental cause of perception” (1666, 176). See Michaelian (2009, 32-33,
fn. 7).
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This key difference between Cavendish and Hobbes – patterning instead of pressure by
body-body contact – figures in Cavendish’s thought experiment in Letter IV of the Letters
(1664). Cavendish begins Letter IV by highlighting Leviathan I as her target, where she quotes
Hobbes: “That the cause of Sense or Sensitive perception is the external body of Object, which
presses the Organ proper to each Sense” (1664, 18). She appeals to Opinions as the “ground” of
her objection against Hobbes, repeating the view already discussed that “…Perception is but the
effect of the Sensitive and rational Motions” (1664, 18). She next raises a particular worry for the
pressure account related to bodies that may lie between two perceiving individuals:

Two men may see or hear each other at a distance, and yet there may be other
bodies between them, that do not move to those perceptions, so that no pressure
can be made, for all pressures are by some constraint and force; wherefore,
according to my Opinion, the Sensitive and Rational free motions, do pattern out
each others object, as Figure and Voice in each others Eye and Ear; for Life and
Knowledge, which I name Rational and Sensitive Matter, are in every Creature…
(1664, 18-19; emphasis added).
Like Hobbes, Cavendish is a plenist.13 In this thought experiment she assumes Hobbes’s view of
pressure as moving bodies between these perceivers for a reductio ad absurdum. Given the
pressure view, the worry is that if Hobbes were correct, at certain distances the bodies located
between two perceivers may not move. Were such a scenario possible and yet visual perception
still occurred, pressure could not be responsible for visual perception.
This objection related to the possibility that bodies lying between perceivers may not
move even though visual perception occurs is not devastating since Hobbes could reply that we
should understand the strength of the pressure responsible for visual perception between two
perceivers in degrees. The closer two perceivers are to one another (or one perceiver to any

13

Several passages in the Letters suggest that Cavendish is a plenist (1668, 290, 301-302, and
423).
ADAMS | 10

perceived object), the stronger the pressure would be and, as a result, the more the bodies
between them would be pressed and the more vivid the visual perception would be. Hobbes
would deny that there are bodies that would communicate absolutely no motion, since he claims
in De corpore XXII.9 that “in a full medium all endeavour proceeds as far as the medium itself
reacheth; that is to say, if the medium be infinite, the endeavour will proceed infinitely” (EW
I.341).
Nevertheless, Hobbes could admit that certain bodies transmit pressure better than others,
so some bodies would be more likely to deaden the pressure than others. For example, both
Kepler and Descartes identify certain parts of the interior of the eye as black in color so that they
deaden light rays passing into the eye (Kepler 1964, 160; Kepler 1604, 176; Descartes 2001, 95;
Descartes 1972, 53-55) and by doing so these parts of the eye contribute to distinct vision. Like
Kepler and Descartes, Hobbes notes in A Minute or First Draught of the Optiques (1983, 81-82)
that the pupil and ciliary processes are black. Although Hobbes does not explicitly claim that the
reason why these parts are black is to deaden reflecting rays, he could accommodate the
Keplerian-Cartesian explanation into his pressure-as-perception account by positing that darkcolored bodies like these parts of the eye deaden pressure and thus contribute positively to
distinct vision, which for Hobbes occurs along the optic axis.
This reply to Cavendish’s first worry in Letter IV has affinity with how Hobbes
understands the motions that are constitutive of perceiving, imagining, dreaming, and
remembering in terms of the degree of their intensity. For example, in Leviathan II Hobbes
identifies imagination as “nothing but decaying sense” (Hobbes 1994, 8; emphasis original). As
the motion responsible for sense continues to decay, it becomes “fading, old, and past,” and this
is what we call “memory” (Hobbes 1994, 9). A view that understood the pressure between

ADAMS | 11

perceivers in degrees could hold that there needs to be a threshold of pressure reached for visual
perception to occur: if there were bodies that did not move easily between two perceivers then a
sufficient degree of pressure could not be transmitted and continued to a perceiver. As a result,
these two individuals may not perceive one another at all.14
Cavendish’s second objection in Letter IV continues with the same example of two men
perceiving one another at a distance. She argues that “…if the sensitive and rational motions be
irregular in those parts [of the sensitive organs], between which the perception is made, as for
example, in the two fore-mentioned men, that see and hear each other, then they neither both see
nor hear each other perfectly” (1664, 19-20). Here Cavendish is taking what she thinks is an
everyday example drawn from experience: in a two-perceiver situation, person A may perceive
person B more clearly than B perceives A. Another similar example would involve two
individuals perceiving the same object at differing levels of clarity, though Cavendish does not
mention this possibility: individual A may perceive some object C more or less perfectly than
another individual B standing next to him or her.
Cavendish claims that her account of visual perception as patterning can explain this
everyday occurrence better than Hobbes’s account. It is commonplace that “one [individual] may
see the other better and more perfectly”; however, Cavendish argues that “if perception were
made by pressure, there would not be any such mistakes” (1664, 20). Cavendish’s criticism of
the pressure view seems to rely upon seeing Hobbesian visual perception as passive for
perceivers. On the pressure account, the information, as it were, acquired by perceiving human
perceivers is impressed upon sense organs by the motions from bodies outside of the perceiver,

Hobbes provides an example of our inability to see a single grain of sand that is “removed to
such a distance as not to be any longer seen, though by its action it still work upon the organs of
sight” (De corpore XXII.9, EW I.342).
14
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which information continues into the body of the perceiving individuals by pressure of one part
of the body upon another.
Cavendish’s idea is that if pressure alone were sufficient to explain visual perception, and
perceivers (and their sense organs) played a passive role during it, then we should expect
uniform levels of clarity in visual perception. Two persons perceiving each other, or perhaps two
individuals perceiving the same object, should both perceive with the same level of clarity since
only the pressure from without would determine how clearly an object is perceived (and since
she seems to consider Hobbesian visual perception as passive, this pressure would be equal for
both perceivers). Since we do, in fact, experience differences in the clarity of visual perception
on a regular basis, Cavendish holds that we should clearly see the deficiency of Hobbes’s
perception-as-pressure account.
This second criticism of the Hobbesian perception-as-pressure account is potentially
more damaging than the first criticism encountered in Letter IV (already discussed), for if it were
correct it would undercut the explanatory breadth of Hobbes’s account by showing that his
assumptions about the nature of visual perception were too simplistic. Unlike Cavendish’s other
criticisms of Hobbes in the Letters, which relate to the general disorder and disunity of the world
that would result were his account correct, what she calls a “perpetual dance …which would
produce a very Restless Life” (1663, Another Epistle to the Reader), this criticism instead points
to a phenomenon that Cavendish argues Hobbes is unable to explain. In the next section, I will
provide a response on Hobbes’s behalf that draws upon his optical work in De homine and then
in the following section re-characterize Cavendish’s objection in light of this Hobbesian response
as relating to a different explanandum than the order and regularity present in the world (see fn.
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1), namely, why there are different levels of clarity in visual perception in typically-functioning
human perceivers.

3. A Hobbesian reply to Cavendish’s criticism in Letter IV
A reply on Hobbes’s behalf to Cavendish’s second criticism would appeal to physiological
differences in the sense organs between the two individuals in her thought experiment.
According to this reply, we can account for person A perceiving person B less perfectly than B
perceives A because of some defect in A’s sense organs. Likewise, if we focused on the parallel
example of two individuals perceiving the same object, we could explain why individual B
perceives the basketball more perfectly than individual A because of either some defect of her
sense organs or because of some disturbance in the media between the ball and A not present in
the media between B and the ball. The perception-as-pressure account would understand
differences in the clarity of visual perception by A and B to be due to a disruption in the pressure
from the perceived object to the perceivers, whether a disruption by the receiving sense organ or
something in the media. In this section, I first discuss this reply on Hobbes’s behalf by drawing
upon his explanation of the “confusion of vision by the fault of the eye” in De homine 2.4. Next I
show that this explanation may have been amenable to Cavendish in her first edition of the
Opinions (1655), but it would not have been acceptable to her by the time of her second edition
of that work (1663) and likewise not in her Letters (1664).
After Hobbes discusses the optic axis, the visual line “in which alone is vision distinct”
(OL II.11), he treats instances where vision in the optic axis is “confused.” Hobbes focuses first
on cases in which vision is “confused from the smallness of an object” (De homine 2.3, OL
II.11). He argues that whenever we perceive very small objects, or large objects that are very far
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away, our vision is confused because the pupil is unable to be contracted sufficiently to allow
only the rays from those small objects to enter and thus prevent oblique rays, such as the oblique
ray from object A that strikes the pupil at C and after passing through E and reflects along the
line E-F (see Figure 1 below). Such rays enter and confuse our vision, as Hobbes demonstrates
with a constructed diagram of an eye, because “pupil C is not able to be contracted in order to
shut out all of the oblique rays” (OL II.11).

Figure 1 (from 1658 edition of De homine)

In the following article (De homine 2.4), Hobbes examines instances when vision is
confused “from the fault of the eye” (a vitio oculorum; OL II.12). Hobbes retains the diagram
from the previous article, but now he supposes two additional conditions related to the size and
shape of the parts of the eye. First, he considers what would result from having a retina of a
smaller shape than the retina considered in De homine 2.3; he compares the original retina with a
smaller retina described by M-B-I on Figure 1. He argues that “the confusion at each point of the
object to this point will be greater” with retina M-B-I because “the center of the retina will be
nearer to the lowest part B” around point H.
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Confusion will be greater because of the way that rays would refract inside an eye with a
smaller retina like M-B-I. As already mentioned, for the eye considered in De homine 2.3, when
the ray from A strikes the pupil obliquely at C it reflects away from the retina along line E-F.
When this happens, our vision is confused, and we perceive object A as located in the wrong
location: “point A will appear at the line E-F” (OL I.11). However, when the eye with retina MB-I is considered, Hobbes argues that, after the ray from object A strikes the retina at B, it will
pass through the center of the retina at point H, rather than at point E. As a result, it will continue
along line H-G, causing object A to appear along line H-G.
The smaller spherical shape of retina M-B-I thus causes greater confusion of vision when
we perceive objects, such as object A, by means of oblique rays. The reason for this is that the
apparent location is farther from the actual location of object A than the apparent location would
be with the originally-considered, larger retina. In other words, if the size of the retina were
smaller, our perception of objects by means of oblique rays, which is already confused, would be
even more confused; we would perceive objects such as A along H-G which is farther away from
perceiving them as being along E-F, and thus more confused.
The second condition, or fault, of the eye leading to confused vision that Hobbes
considers results from a change in the crystalline humour. He considers what consequences there
would be from this humour being smaller or larger in size, or being farther from or closer to the
retina. In each of these dispositions of the crystalline humour, “the confusion will always be
greater” (OL II.12) than its typical arrangement. Vision would be more confused with these
changes because the refractions that would result would be greater and thus cause point A to be
seen alone a line that is further to the left or right of the optic axis than A would otherwise
appear.
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These demonstrations related to the two conditions of the parts of the eye, made upon the
basis of the behavior of refracting and reflecting lines, allow Hobbes to explain conditions that
result in confused vision. For example, a corollary that he draws from these explanations
explains that one reason why confused vision occurs in old age, or why it occurs with those who
are “dim-sighted,” is that the retina is contracted, becoming smaller like the retina described by
M-B-I in Figure 1 (OL II.12-13). He notes that eyeglasses, or “a perforated plate with a small
aperture, or a small pipe brought into contact with the eye” provide a remedy for those with such
a “fault” in vision because they filter out the oblique rays that would otherwise confuse vision.
This foray into the optics of De homine has had the goal of showing a possible reply to
Cavendish that Hobbes could have offered. Cavendish claims in Letter IV that in the case of two
individuals perceiving one another, “one may see the other better and more perfectly” but “if
perception were made by pressure, there would not be any such mistakes” (1664, 20). However,
in De homine 2 we find a potential answer to this objection. If one of the two individuals in
Cavendish’s thought experiment were “dim-sighted,” to use Hobbes’s term, then the dim-sighted
individual would see the other less perfectly than the other saw him. Granting Cavendish’s
assumptions in the thought experiment, we could say that the pressure being transmitted by
media between A and B would be equal, but that the reception of that pressure by the dimsighted individual A would be hindered, thus causing him to have a less perfect perception of B
than B has of A.
Cavendish may have found this Hobbes-inspired reply satisfying around the time of her
work in the 1650s. Indeed, in Chapter 162 of the first edition of Opinions (1655), she explains
blindness similarly by outlining the seven “defects” that cause it. By “blindness” she does not
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mean the total loss of sight but instead she means the obscuring of vision, as is evident from one
example that she provides of it as perceiving objects in a location other than their actual location:

A second defect may be in the ball of the eye; for according to the compasse of
the concave, or convex thereof, the objects are presented nearer, or at a further
distance, or longer or shorter, or broader, or narrower (1655, 121).
Cavendish claims that the curvature of the ball of the eye will influence the location at which we
perceive objects in our visual field, a claim similar to the way in which the size of the sphere of
the retina M-B-I would impact the apparent location of perceived objects for Hobbes. However,
this explanation of “blindness” that she provides in Chapter 162 of the 1655 edition is not present
in the later 1663 edition, and neither are the other six explanations that she offers in that earlier
work.
In the 1655 edition there appears to be a tension between two views about the nature of
visual perception. On the one hand, Cavendish claims that “…the sense of seeing is not lost,
although the eyes were out, and the optick nerves stopped up” (1655, 118; retained in 1663, 294295, discussed in section 2 above). This view appears to diminish the role of the sensory organs
in explaining visual perception. On the other hand, as seen above in the quotation, Cavendish
aims to explain “blindness,” understood as obscured vision, not by appeal to differences in
patterning self-motions, as would be expected from the later “two men” thought experiment in
the Letters (1664), but by appeal to features of the sense organs like the curvature of the “ball of
the eye.” Other physical features she considers in Chapter 162 of the 1655 edition include what
would be the result if the optick nerve “be full of slime” or if the “eyes move too quick, or too
slow” (1655, 122).
Given the tension between these two views, it seems that in 1655 Cavendish could
explain differences in the visual perceptions of the two individuals either by appeal to
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physiological differences by appealing to the roundness of eye balls, the size of pupils, and so
on, or by appeal to differences in patterning self-motions. However, by the 1663 edition of
Opinions this tension disappears because she removes the explanations of blindness, and she
abandons explaining differences in visual perception between individuals by reference to
physiological differences in the parts of the eye. She is similarly unconcerned with offering such
explanations in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666).15
Although in 1655 Cavendish may have been persuaded by the potential Hobbesian reply
to the “two men” thought experiment criticism offered above, by the time of her second edition
of the Opinions (1663) and the Letters (1664) she would not have accepted an explanation of
differences in visual perception by appeal to physical characteristics of the sense organs.
Cavendish’s removal of the explanations blindness is evidence for this claim; the main difficulty
for the Hobbesian account of perception by the time of the publications of the 1660s is that it
relies upon pressure. As I discuss in the following section, in the 1660s Cavendish holds that
pressure is explanatorily impotent when it comes to accounting for differences in visual
perception like those present in the “two men” thought experiment.

4. Reconsidering the “Two Men” Thought Experiment
4.1 Sensory Organs and Explaining Defects in Hearing and Seeing
The discussion regarding Cavendish’s removal of the chapter on “blindness” between the 1655
and 1663 editions of Opinions should not be taken to imply that in the later works she saw the

Cavendish’s interest in blindness in Observations concerns what blind individuals could know
about color by touch (1666, 82-83, 87) and the sort of motions that occur in the “optic
sensorium” even in the absence of being able to use the optic sense in case of blindness (1666,
154).
15
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structure of sense organs as entirely irrelevant to visual perception. Instead, I will show in this
section that this removal should be seen as part of her greater emphasis upon self-motion and
patterning in the 1663 edition. The primary issue behind her criticism of Hobbes in Letter IV is
not whether defects in sense organs are sufficient to explain differences in perceptions between
the two individuals; instead, the issue is whether the perception-as-pressure model is sufficiently
explanatorily potent. The thought experiment is designed to show that the Hobbesian model is
not explanatorily potent.
Although Cavendish removes her chapter on blindness from 1663 edition, she does hold
that parts of the body are sometimes relevant to explaining certain aspects of perception in later
works. She uses communication by speech between human individuals as a model for thinking
about how the senses work. She begins making this connection by noting that
…some may think it strange, that One Word should strike or enter into Several
Ears at One Time, but surely it is not more strange that One Word should strike
…many Several Ears than that One Object shall enter into many Several Eyes at
One Time… (1663, 299).
The connection between hearing a spoken word and two perceivers seeing the same object is
meant to be straightforward. The self-motions of the senses constitute visual perception by
imitating the motions of the objects, and in the same way the self-motions of other parts of the
body imitate the motions responsible for the communication of words from one speaker to
another.
Speech and perception both depend upon the production – by patterning – of many copies
of self-motions. Cavendish explains how there is a multitude of such copies made when
communication by words occurs: “when as a Man Speaks to an other man, [words] are made
many times over Several ways; as for Example, a Man before he Speaks, Thinks of those Words
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he should speak, then those are made in the Mind of the Speaker, by the Rational matter and
motions…” (1663, 299-300). Cavendish continues by noting that these words, as motions, are
then copied in the mouth of the speaker, in the speaker’s ears when he hears himself speak, and
finally in the listener’s ears when he hears and in his mind. If the speaker is communicating to a
group of individuals, then from the words he speaks “are made Multitudes of Copies” (1663,
300).
Communication by words occurs not by some transmission of motion from one body to
another, but by the sensitive matter of one body imitating the self-motion of another by
patterning. This model of patterning present in verbal communication also explains how
perception works. However, and here we find the relevance of the sensory organs even in
Cavendish’s works of the 1660s, if multiple copies of sounds or figures perceived are present,
one might worry that “more would enter the Ear [or Eye] than was needful, and so would make a
Confusion” (1663, 301). The apparent worry is that multiple copies would be copied
simultaneously by an eye or an ear and result in confused perception or hearing. Cavendish
responds to this worry by asserting that properly functioning sense organs will imitate only what
is necessary: “I answer, that [such a confusion] cannot easily be, unless the Ear be Defective, the
like for the Eye, as so for the other Senses” (1663, 301; emphasis added). So in some instances
defective visual perception or hearing can be explained by a fault of the sense organs, but the
fault in such organs would be a fault in patterning; for example, they may pattern too many
motions and cause confusion.
Cavendish discusses the special role for sense organs, such as the eye in perception, later
in Observations (1666). She considers the following question: “But some may ask, If a man be
so blind that he cannot make use of his optic sense; what is become of the sensitive motions in
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that same part of his body, to wit, the optic sensorium?” (1666, 154). She argues that even in the
absence of a functioning eye, these motions in the optic sensorium will continue, but they will be
altered or changed, allowing a blind individual to “guess by touch.” But such a guess by touch of
how an object would appear if seen will be imperfect since “we cannot perfectly know it, except
we saw it, by reason the perception of sight belongs only to the optic sense” (1666, 154).
If Cavendish holds that the sense organs are relevant to explaining visual perception, and
to accounting for why visual perception can be more or less perfect, why would she reject the
Hobbesian reply to the “two men” thought experiment offered in the preceding section?
Although she removes the explanations of blindness from the 1663 edition of Opinions, she
nevertheless appeals to sense organs as explanatorily relevant in that same edition, as already
discussed, and in the later Observations (1666). In the remainder of this section, I will argue that
the reason why the Hobbesian reply offered above in section 3 would fail in Cavendish’s view is
that it would still rely upon understanding the motion responsible for perception as pressure.
Cavendish agrees with Hobbes that visual perception must be understood in terms of motion, but
she articulates rational and sensitive self-motion as capable of more diverse forms of motion than
simplistic Hobbesian pressure. Pressure is too blunt an explanans to do the work needed in
explaining differences, sometimes subtle differences, in perception.

4.2 Pressure as the Target of the Two Men Thought Experiment
Given Cavendish’s interest in explaining some instances of imperfect perception or hearing by
appealing to the sense organs in both the works from the 1650s and 1660s, as already discussed,
it is worth attending to her mention of sense organs in the thought experiment from Letter IV.
She notes about these two men that
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…if one’s motions be perfect, but the other’s irregular and erroneous, then one
sees and hears better than the other; or if the Sensitive and Rational Motions move
more regularly and make perfecter patterns in the Eye then in the Ear, then they
see better than they hear; and if more perfectly in the Ear than in the Eye, they
hear better than they see: And so it may be said of each man singly, for one man
may see the other better and more perfectly, then the other may see him; and this
man may hear the other better and more perfectly, then the other may hear him;
whereas, if perception were made by pressure, there would not be any such
mistakes. (1664, 20)
I have included the complete quotation from the thought experiment in Letter IV of the Letters
because it shows the ways that Cavendish thinks that her account of self-motion can handle
slight differences between situations that she holds Hobbes cannot. Against Hobbes, Cavendish
claims that “if perception were made by pressure, there would not be any such mistakes” in
perception (1664, 20).
Although Cavendish’s criticism that “besides the hard pressure of objects…would rather
annoy and obscure, then inform” (1664, 20) is distinct from the criticism I am examining (it is
related to the criticism that disorder that would result from perception-as-pressure), it does reveal
how she thinks of Hobbesian pressure. It seems that on Cavendish’s view the pressure to which
Hobbes appeals is a unilateral, forceful motion that could not account for subtle differences in
perception between individuals like those considered in the “two men” thought experiment. In
the face of the force of the pressure from external objects, the perceiver is passive.
In contrast to Hobbesian pressure, in Opinions Cavendish portrays the rational and
sensitive motions as much more complex in nature, capable of representing better because they
are capable of more diverse forms of motion, as well as active in patterning out the self-motions
that they witness. Thus to explain an instance of imperfect perception, Cavendish may appeal to
a deficit in patterning by a sense organ or to the motions of the sensitive or rational matter as
they imitate one another. In Opinions Part VI, chapter XVI, she describes the rational and
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sensitive matter as “the highest Extract” and as the “Quintessence of Nature (1663, 275). The
rational animate matter has “no incumbrances” when it moves, and it “can Divide and Unite,
Dilatate and Contract itself Infinite Several ways in its own Substance and motions” (1663, 275).
The sensitive animate matter moves “after another manner” because it is linked with the
inanimate matter: “…it Divides and Composes, Dilatates and Contracts with the Inanimate
matter” (1663, 275). In contrast to Hobbesian pressure, Cavendish holds that these self-motions
are capable of a greater degree of differences than pressure and thus are more explanatorily
potent.
In addition to positing motions that are more complex than simple Hobbesian pressure, in
the extended quotation above from the “two men” thought experiment Cavendish appeals to the
regularity of a perceiver’s rational and sensitive motions. She holds that “if the Sensitive and
Rational Motions move more regularly and make perfecter patterns in the Eye then in the Ear,
then they see better than they hear” (1664, 20). The regularity of the sensitive or rational motions
of a creature can explain why its perceptions have a particular quality, but the way that the
regularity of the rational and sensitive motions are coordinated with one another also impacts the
clarity of perception. She argues in Opinions that in the typically-functioning creature there will
be a “sympathetical agreement, and Natural Unity between the Rational and Sensitive matter and
motions” (1663, 75), but imperfect perception will result where such an “agreement” is lacking.16

16

This understanding typical function as sympathetical agreement might seem to run contrary to
the earlier discussion of the two men thought experiment as designed to show how Cavendish
can better account for differences in clarify of perception among typical perceivers. This tension
appears to arise within the text of the Letters where Cavendish views irregular motions as “those
motions which move not after the ordinary, common or usual way or manner” (Letters, 360) or
as “not always moving after their usual and accustomed way” (Letters, 538). I suggest that
Cavendish understands typical function as a continuum, and that typically-functioning
perceivers, like the individuals in the two men thought experiment, may nevertheless make small
errors. This view is supported by a distinction that Cavendish makes in Ground between “small
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This agreement that Cavendish describes occurs for “safety and defense” of creatures, so
that when a creature is attacked by another creature “all the Powers, Faculties… strive to defend
themselves from Hurt or Dissolution; the Rational advises, the sensitive acts…” (1663, 75). The
ability of the rational matter to “advise” should be understood as having an influence whereby
the sensitive matter is more likely to imitate (pattern) the motions of the rational matter than the
rational matter is to imitate the sensitive.17 In other words, this influence of the rational matter
upon the sensitive matter occurs not by means of a transfer of motion by pressure but rather by
the rational matter causing the sensitive to move like a hand can cause a ball to self-move. As
Cavendish will argue later in the Observations, the ball does not “move by the hand’s motion,
but by its own,” for the hand is “only an occasion that the …ball moves thus and thus” (1666,
139-140).
Sometimes the rational matter and sensitive matter break from this sympathetical
agreement and instead act at odds with one another. When such a disturbance occurs, the internal
self-motions are disrupted and the functions of the creature, such as visual perception, are
negatively affected. In Opinions Part VI, chapter XVIII, Cavendish describes this sympathetical
agreement in terms of the regularity of motions and its disruption in terms of their irregularity.
When the motions of the sensitive and rational matter are both regular they agree, but sometimes

Errors” and “high Irregularities.” This distinction suggests that she would view the two men
thought experiment as a common-place small error in need of being explained: “when one man
mistakes another, that is some small Error, both of the Sense and Reason. Also, when one man
cannot readily remember another man, with whom he had formerly been acquainted, it is an
Error; and such small Errors, the Sense and Reason do soon rectifie: but in causes of high
Irregularities, as in Madness, Sickness, and the like, there is a great Bustle amongst the Parts of a
Human Creature” (1668, 82-83).
17
Cavendish will similarly argue in Observations that rational perception is superior to sensitive
perception because rational perception is “so active and subtle, as it is the best informer and
reformer of all sensitive perception” (1666, 47). For discussion, see Boyle (2015, 445-446).
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the “Rational motions are Regular, and the Sensitive Irregular” (1663, 277) and there is a
disruption. Likewise, the sensitive motions may be regular while the rational motions are
irregular, causing disruption of the internal motions.
Similar to the way in which the rational matter can influence the sensitive matter by
“advising” it, through their self-motions the rational and sensitive matter can influence one
another to be irregular: “oftentimes the Irregularity of the Rational motions, causes the
Irregularity of the Sensitive, and oftentimes the Irregularity of the Sensitive motions, causes the
Irregularity of the Rational” (1663, 277). Indeed, in Part VI, chapter XVII Cavendish holds that
the “Rational motions in the Mind have great Power over the Sensitive motions in the Body”
(1663, 276). She describes this influence as the ability of the rational motions to “persuade” or
“command” the sensitive motions (also “inform” and “reform”; cf. fn. 17).
The influence that the rational motions have over the sensitive is understood as the
greater inclination of the sensitive motions to pattern after the rational motions. As an example,
Cavendish considers when “the Rational motions are so much Irregular, as to be Tumultuous, so
as to cause Fearfull Imaginations….which cause the Sensitive motions to move Irregularly and
Tumultuously” (1663, 277). This irregularity of the rational motions “causes the Sensitive
motions to Print in the Sensitive passages Irregular Objects” such as “Hobgoblins, Spirits, and
Devils” or to hear strange noises, smell unusual scents, and feel unusual touches (1663, 277).
Such a violence of the rational motions when mimicked by the sensitive motions can impart
unusual strength and intensity to the sensitive motions, which Cavendish takes to explain why
“Mad men in the Mad fits, have many times more Strength” than they do otherwise (1663, 278).
In summary, Cavendish’s criticism in Letter IV of Hobbesian perception-as-pressure as
unable to account for “any such mistakes” in perception (1664, 20) reflects her views about the
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diverse kinds of motions that are responsible for visual perception. The diverse motions of which
the sensitive and rational matter are capable – motions of dividing and composing, as well as of
dilating and contracting – provide the potential for finer detail and greater explanatory potency
than the overly simplistic perception-as-pressure model where perceivers are passive. With such
diverse motions in her account, Cavendish can explain more subtle differences between
perceivers than Hobbes can with pressure. In addition to being able to appeal to these types of
motions, Cavendish can also appeal to differences in the regularity of the sensitive and rational
motions, and to the influence of one upon the other.
Cavendish later develops her account of visual perception in Part VI of the Ground
(1668). There she appeals to the self-knowledge that parts of human bodies have regarding how
they are to act (Boyle 2015, 441-442). In Chapter IX, Cavendish compares the knowledge that
body parts have to the knowledge that individual humans have: “…as one Human Creature doth
not know what another Human Creature knows but by Confederacy; so, no Part of the Body, or
Mind of a Man, knows each Part’s perceptive knowledg[e], but by Confederacy” (1668, 81-82).
As in her earlier accounts discussed already, she appeals to regularity to understand the
coordination between reason and sense: “sometimes, the Human Sense is regular, and the Human
Reason irregular; and sometimes the Reason regular, and the Sense irregular” (1668, 82). When
such difference occurs, she holds that “the Regular Parts endeavour to reform the Irregular”
(Ibid.). Sometimes the errors introduced are “small,” but other times “high Irregularities” occur
(cf. fn. 16).
This account of properly-functioning parts knowing what they should do, as possessing
self-knowledge, in Ground allows Cavendish to explain being blind, for example, by identifying
the eyes themselves as “natural fools.” She argues that with such a “defect” “those Parts have no
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knowledg[e] of such Properties that belong to such Parts” (1668, 85). Blindness thus is caused by
a failure of the eyes insofar as they no longer know what to do as eyes. In the case of such
defects, she identifies old age as a decay in the self-knowledge of body parts: “sometimes the
Sensitive Body decays, before the Rational Mind; and sometimes the Rational Mind, before the
Sensitive Body” (1668, 86). These later developments in her view in the Ground allow her to
accommodate more subtle failures of visual perception, such as in the two men thought
experiment, with even greater explanatory resources than in her previous work, and they
represent a third stage in her development of her account of visual perception beyond what was
evident around the time she composed the Letters. The earlier discussion of the transition from
the 1655 edition of Opinions to the 1663 edition showed Cavendish removing from her account
the physiological characteristics of the eyes in her explanation of blindness and appealing to
patterning self-motions. Her later development of these ideas in the Ground incorporates her
view of matter as intelligent and draws upon the idea of self-knowledge, which can be possessed
more or less by parts of the human body, as essential to explaining defects in visual perception.
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